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1Proposed Running Head: Risk Aversion and Bargaining
Abstract
We revisit the well-known result that asserts that an increase in the degree of one’s risk
aversion improves the position of one’s opponents. To this end, we apply Yaari’s dual theory of
choice under risk both to Nash’s bargaining problem and to Rubinstein’s game of alternating
oﬀers. Under this theory, unlike under expected utility, risk aversion inﬂuences the bargaining
outcome only when this outcome is random, namely, when the players are risk-lovers. In this
case, an increase in one’s degree of risk aversion increases one’s share of the pie. Journal of
Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C70, C78.
21 Introduction
One of the results most frequently quoted in the bargaining literature asserts that increasing risk
aversion reduces a player’s share in the bargaining outcome and increases that of his opponent.
This result1 has appeared in diﬀerent variations including both the cooperative and the non-
cooperative frameworks. (See Kannai (1977), Khilstrom, Roth, and Schmeidler (1981), Sobel
(1981), Thomson (1988), Osborne (1984), Roth (1985), and Roth (1989).)
This result has gained popularity partly because it seems very intuitive. The assumptions un-
der which the result holds, however, are somewhat restrictive. For instance, Roth and Rothblum
(1982) (see also Safra, Zhou, and Zilcha (1990)) show that if the set of feasible agreements includes
lotteries, then an increase in one’s opponent’s risk aversion might be disadvantageous. Safra and
Zilcha (1993) show that if the agents’ risk-preferences belong to a wide family of non-expected
utility preferences, then the eﬀect of changes in the degree of risk aversion on the bargaining
outcome is not conclusive. In particular, they show an example where an agent is hurt by an
increase of his opponent’s risk aversion.
Even under the assumptions where the result holds, there are some problems with its inter-
pretation. Risk aversion aﬀects the bargaining outcome in cases (like the framework of the Nash
bargaining problem) where the underlying outcomes involve no lotteries and thus no risk at all.
Indeed, Roth (1985) uses the term “strategic risk” when referring to these cases. He interprets
this risk as arising from each player’s ignorance of his opponent’s actions, thus resulting in a
subjective probability that no agreement will be reached during the negotiations that are under-
way. But these probabilities are outside the model and their eﬀect on the bargaining outcome is
therefore dubious.
When the underlying outcomes include lotteries, there is still a problem with the interpretation
of the result. Consider a situation where two risk-averse expected utility maximizers bargain over
one perfectly divisible dollar. Even when the agents can agree on a random division of the money,
the Nash bargaining solution selects a non-random division. Since the outcome in this case is not
random, one would expect that changes in the degree of the agents’ risk aversion did not aﬀect
the outcome. As is well known, however, the Nash bargaining solution awards increasing shares
of the dollar to the agent whose opponent becomes more risk-averse. The result is even more
striking when we consider the case of two risk-loving agents who bargain over a dollar. In this
case, the Nash bargaining solution selects the random outcome that assigns the whole dollar to
each of the agents with probability 1/2, independently of their degree of risk loving. In this case,
1Henceforth we will refer to the result mentionedabove as “the result.”
3even though the outcome is a non-degenerate lottery, changes in the degree of risk loving have
no eﬀect whatsoever on the outcome.
Instead of considering, as Safra and Zilcha (1993) do, a large class of non-expected utility
preferences, this paper restricts attention to one particular model of choice under risk. Speciﬁcally,
we analyze the comparative statics of changes in risk aversion when agents’ preferences follow the
dual theory of choice under risk proposed by Yaari (1987). Under this theory, the objects of choice
are lotteries over monetary outcomes. The term dual refers to the feature that when this theory
is compared to the expected utility theory, the roles of monetary outcomes and probabilities are
reversed. In particular, while the expected utility functional is linear in probabilities and not
necessarily linear in monetary outcomes, the dual theory utility functional is linear in monetary
outcomes and not necessarily linear in probabilities.
By restricting attention to the dual theory we are able to obtain some positive results, which
can be compared to the predictions of the model with expected utility maximizers. Further,
these results do not suﬀer from the interpretational diﬃculties that we mentioned above. Another
reason for concentrating on the dual theory is that it proved to be useful in economic applications
(see for example Demers and Demers (1990), Hadar and Seo (1995) and Volij (1999)). We believe
that the prominence of expected utility theory is derived not only from the fact that it is supported
by an elegant axiomatic characterization (a property that is shared by the dual theory) but also
from its usefulness in economic applications.
Risk aversion is usually deﬁned as aversion to mean-preserving spreads. Under expected
utility maximization, this is equivalent to the concavity of the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility
function. Under the dual theory, risk aversion is equivalent to the convexity of the “dual function”
with which probabilities are evaluated. As a result, the concept of risk aversion is not entangled
with the agent’s attitude towards wealth. In particular, preferences over sure outcomes give no
information about the agent’s degree of risk aversion. One immediate consequence is that if the
underlying set of allocations involves no lotteries, the bargaining solution will be invariant to
changes in risk attitude. As we pointed out earlier, this is not the case under the expected utility
framework.
If the dual theory resulted in essentially the same predictions concerning the relation between
risk aversion and bargaining outcomes, there would be little point in carrying out this exercise.
The same would be true if the predictions were ambiguous. The interesting message, however, is
that whenever changes in risk aversion aﬀect the bargaining outcome according to the dual theory,
they aﬀect it in precisely the opposite direction compared with expected utility theory. Namely,
more risk-loving reduces a player’s payoﬀ and increases that of his opponent. Our analysis
4includes both Nash’s (cooperative) framework and Rubinstein’s non-cooperative framework. In
both cases, the set of underlying bargaining outcomes is deﬁned in the standard way, i.e., as
consisting of all allocations of a divisible physical unit (money) plus lotteries on such allocations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of Yaari’s dual theory. After
presenting a simple bargaining situation in Section 3, Section 4 formulates the corresponding
Nash bargaining problem in terms of this theory. Our ﬁrst result argues that if both players are
risk-averse, then changes in risk aversion do not aﬀect the Nash bargaining allocation. Then we
take up the case of risk-loving players. We show that if both players are risk-loving, players who
become more risk-loving are worse oﬀ while their opponents are better oﬀ. Section 5 considers the
strategic framework where two impatient players play a game of alternating oﬀers. The outcome
of this game is consistent with the results of the cooperative approach. Finally, Section 6 shows
that another commonly used strategic model, one where the players are not impatient but face
a probability of a negotiations breakdown, yields very diﬀerent results. Moreover, its predictions
are not consistent with the outcomes of the cooperative approach. One should note that, in
contrast, the two strategic models are strategically equivalent if the players satisfy the expected
utility axioms.
2 A Short Review of the Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
Let r be a random variable that takes values in the unit interval. Denote by Gr its decumulative
distribution function (DDF), which is deﬁned by
Gr(x)=P r {r>x }, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
It is known that Gr is non-increasing, right-continuous and satisﬁes Gr(1) = 0. The random
variable r represents a lottery over monetary outcomes. Two random variables, r and s,a r e
comonotonic if for every pair of states, ω and ω ,( r(ω) − r(ω ))(s(ω) − s(ω )) ≥ 0. In words,
r and s are comonotonic if, when going from state ω to ω  in Ω, both random variables move
(weakly) in the same direction.
The primitive of the dual theory is the set ∆ of all non-increasing, right-continuous functions
G :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] that satisfy G(1) = 0. This set is interpreted as the set of all DDF’s associated
with some random variable deﬁned on some suﬃciently rich probability space Ω and taking values
in [0,1].
Let   be a complete preference relation on ∆. Yaari (1987) imposes the following axioms on
5 :
1. continuity (with respect to L1-convergence),
2. monotonicity: if Gr ≥ Gs then Gr   Gs,a n d
3. dual independence: if r, s and t are pairwise comonotonic and Gr   Gs, then Gαr+(1−α)t  
Gαs+(1−α)t.
Continuity is a technical requirement. Monotonicity requires that if Gr stochastically dom-
inates Gs then Gr   Gs. The dual independence axiom is where the dual theory departs from
the traditional expected utility theory. It deals with portfolios of comonotonic random variables.
Dual independence requires that whenever r, s,a n dt are pairwise comonotonic and Gr   Gs,
then any portfolio containing a proportion α of r and 1 − α of t should be weakly preferred to a
portfolio containing α of s and 1 − α of t.
Yaari (1987) uses the above axioms in the following representation theorem.
Theorem 1 A complete preference relation   satisﬁes continuity, monotonicity, and dual inde-
pendence if and only if there exists a continuous and non-decreasing real function g,d e ﬁ n e do n
the unit interval, such that for all Gr and Gs belonging to ∆,







Moreover, the function g is unique up to a positive aﬃne transformation.
The function g is analogous to the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function and, in a sense,
we can say that g “represents” the agent’s preferences. Graphically, an agent whose preferences
are described by the dual theory evaluates random variables according to the area under a suitable
transformation (the function g)o ft h e i rD D F .





Theorem 1 says that agents will choose among random variables so as to maximize U. Further,
Yaari (1987) also shows that U is “linear” in payments. Formally, let a>0a n db be two real
numbers and let v and av + b be two random variables taking values in the unit interval. Then
U(av + b)=aU(v)+b.
6One of the appealing features of the dual theory is that, unlike expected utility theory, the
agent’s attitude towards risk is not entangled with his attitude towards wealth. More speciﬁcally,
under the dual theory, marginal utility of wealth is constant and this feature is consistent with any
attitude towards risk. In particular, Yaari (1987) shows that a preference relation   that satisﬁes
the dual theory’s axioms exhibits risk aversion if and only if the function g that represents   is
convex. In this paper, we will be interested in the eﬀect of changes in the degree of an agent’s risk
aversion on bargaining outcomes. For this purpose, it is necessary to understand what it means
for one agent to be more risk-averse than another. Following Yaari (1986), since risk aversion
is characterized by the convexity of the function g, it would be natural to deﬁne an agent to be
more risk-averse than another if and only if the former’s g is more convex than the latter’s.
Deﬁnition 1 Let  1 and  2 be two preference relations that satisfy the dual theory’s axioms
and that are represented by the functions g1 and g2, respectively. We say that  1 is more risk
averse than  2 if and only if there exists a convex function h, deﬁned on the unit interval, such
that g1 = h ◦ g2.
For p ∈ [0,1] let  1,p  denote the lottery that assigns 1 with probability p and 0 with proba-
bility 1 − p. The above deﬁnition is equivalent to requiring that for every random variable r,i f
 1,p 1 ∼ 1 r and  1,p 2 ∼ 2 r, then p1 ≥ p2. In words, for every lottery r, 1’s “probability equiv-
alent” is at least as high as 2’s “probability equivalent.” Under the dual theory, this is stronger
than requiring that for all lotteries, 1’s certainty equivalent be lower than 2’s certainty equivalent.
Under expected utility, however, this is a weaker requirement.2
The characterization of the risk attitude by means of the convexity of a univariate non-
decreasing function makes it relatively easy to analyze the eﬀect of risk aversion on the outcome
of bargaining situations. This is done in the following sections.
3 The Bargaining Situation
Two individuals bargain over one unit of a single commodity (money). Assume that both bar-
gainers’ preferences over risky prospects satisfy the axioms of the dual theory of choice under
risk and are represented by the functions f and g, respectively. Without loss of generality f and
g are chosen so that f(0) = g(0) = 0 and f(1) = g(1) = 1.
2The interestedread er shouldconsult Yaari (1986) for various andequivalent interpretations of Deﬁnition 1.
7Any non-negative division of the single commodity is feasible if both agents agree on it.
Otherwise they get 0. As a result, the set of physical outcomes is
X = {(x1,x 2):x1 + x2 ≤ 1,x 1,x 2 ≥ 0},
and the disagreement physical outcome is D =( 0 ,0).
We shall assume that the bargainers are not constrained to agree on certain (as opposed to
random) outcomes, but that they can agree upon any lottery over elements of X.L e t( Ω ,B,λ)b e
the probability space that consists of the unit square, its Borel sets and the Lebesgue measure. A
lottery is an random variable   :Ω→ X that assigns one physical outcome to each element ω ∈ Ω.
Note that we can think of a lottery   as two random variables ( 1,  2) such that  i :Ω→ [0,1]
and  1(ω)+ 2(ω) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. These are the random variables of each of the agent’s
payoﬀs. We shall denote by F  the decumulative distribution function of the ﬁrst agent’s payoﬀs
and by G  the DDF of the second agent’s payoﬀs. Formally, F (t)=λ({ω ∈ Ω: 1(ω) >t })a n d
G (t)=λ({ω ∈ Ω: 2(ω) >t }). The set of lotteries will be denoted by L. Consequently, the








A lottery   ∈Lis eﬃcient if there is no other lottery    ∈Lthat is weakly preferred to   by both
agents and strictly preferred to   by at least one agent. For the record, note that agent 1’s and







respectively. Moreover, if   is an eﬃcient lottery, then
 1
0 F (t)dt +
 1
0 G (t)dt =1 .
4 The Cooperative Approach
In this section, we analyze the eﬀect of changes in the agents’ degree of risk aversion on the
outcome of a simple bargaining problem, when the agents’ preferences satisfy the axioms of the
dual theory of choice under risk. Recall that Nash (1950) deﬁned a bargaining problem to be
a pair  S,d  where S is a compact convex subset of I R2 such that d ∈ S and there is a point
s ∈ S such that s   d. The set S is the set of feasible utility pairs and d is the utility pair that
coresponds to the disagreement outcome. In our case the bargaining problem is given by the pair
8 S,d  where
S = {(U1( ),U 2( )) :   ∈L } , and d =( U1(0,0),U 2(0,0)) = (0,0).
It follows from the linearity and monotonicity of preferences in payments that the set S is
comprehensive, that is, if s ∈ S and 0 ≤ s  ≤ s then s  ∈ S. Also, since Ui( ) ∈ [0,1] for i =1 ,2,
S is bounded. Using Helly’s selection theorem and the fact that f and g are continuous functions,
it can be shown that S is closed as well. Further, given two lotteries  1 =(  1
1,  1
2)a n d 2 =(  2
1,  2
2),
we can ﬁnd two lotteries ˆ  1 =( ˆ  1
1, ˆ  1
2)a n dˆ  2 =( ˆ  2
1, ˆ  2
2) such that ˆ  1
i and ˆ  2
i are comonotonic, for
i =1 ,2 and such that F j = Fˆ  j and G j = Gˆ  j,f o rj =1 ,2. Therefore, Ui(ˆ  j)=Ui( j), for
i,j =1 ,2. Consider the lottery  ∗ = αˆ  1 +( 1− α)ˆ  2.S i n c eˆ  1 and ˆ  2 are comonotonic, we have
Ui( ∗)=αUi(ˆ  1)+( 1− α)Ui(ˆ  2). This shows that S is convex. Therefore,  S,d  is indeed a
bargaining problem.
A bargaining solution is a function that takes a bargaining problem  S,d  as an input and
returns a point in S. The Nash bargaining solution is the function N that returns the point
s∗ =( s∗
1,s ∗
2) ∈ S that satisﬁes s∗  d and (s∗
1 − d1)(s∗
2 − d2) ≥ (s1 − d1)(s2 − d2) for all
s =( s1,s 2) ∈ S with s  d. Nash (1950) shows that N is the only bargaining solution that
satisﬁes the properties of Pareto optimality, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives,
and invariance with respect to positive aﬃne transformations. Pareto optimality requires that
no feasible agreement is preferred by both agents to the selected agreement. Symmetry dictates
that the selected outcome yield the same utility level for both agents whenever the problem is
symmetric, namely whenever one cannot distinguish one agent from the other by just looking at
the problem  S,d . Independence of irrelevant alternatives requires that the selected outcome
not change if the feasible alternatives are reduced to a smaller set that still contains the selected
outcome. Lastly, invariance requires that if  S ,d    is obtained from  S,d  by means of the
transformations si → αisi + βi,f o ri =1 ,2, where αi > 0a n dβi ∈ I R, then s∗
i
  = αis∗
i + βi,f o r
i =1 ,2, where s∗  and s∗ are the points selected for  S ,d    and  S,d , respectively. This axiom
is motivated by the idea that the selected outcome should depend only on the preferences of
the players and not on their utility representations. Recall that two von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions represent the same expected utility preferences if and only if one is a positive
aﬃne transformation of the other. Therefore  S,d  and  S ,d    can be interpreted as the images
of the feasible agreements and disagreement outcomes, under two pairs (one for each agent)
of equivalent utility representations. Note, however, that the invariance axiom dictates that
s∗
i
  = αis∗
i + βi,f o ri =1 ,2, even if the transition from  S,d  to  S ,d    is not due to a change
9in the utility representations but to a more signiﬁcant change in the feasible agreements. We
shall elaborate on this soon after we give the motivation of the invariance axiom under the dual
preferences.
The axioms of Pareto optimality, symmetry and independence of irrelevant alternatives are
uncontroversial, in the sense that if they are reasonable when agents’ risk preferences satisfy the
von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, they are also reasonable when agents satisfy Yaari’s axioms.
For instance, if it is reasonable that a bargaining solution should not select ineﬃcient outcomes
in general, the same requirement remains reasonable when the agents’ risk preferences satisfy
the dual theory axioms. The invariance axiom is the only one that requires some justiﬁcation
under the dual theory. Recall that according to Yaari’s representation theorem, the agents’ dual
functions f and g are unique up to positive aﬃne transformations. Further, if f  = a1f + b1 and





f (F (t))dt = a1
 1
0






g (G (t))dt = a2
 1
0
g(G (t))dt + b2 = a2U2( )+b2.
As a result, the bargaining problem  S ,d    where
S  = {(U 
1( ),U 
2( )) :   ∈L } , and d  =( U 
1(0,0),U 
2(0,0))
is obtained from  S,d  where
S = {(U1( ),U 2( )) :   ∈L } , and d =( U1(0,0),U 2(0,0))
by means of the transformations s → ais + bi for i =1 ,2. In other words,  S,d  and  S ,d    can
be interpreted as the images of the feasible agreements and disagreement outcomes, under two
pairs (one for each agent) of equivalent cardinal representations. Therefore, if we would like a
bargaining solution to depend on the agents’ risk preferences but not on their respective cardinal
representations, the bargaining solution should satisfy the axiom of invariance to positive aﬃne
transformations.
We said above that the invariance axiom dictates that s∗
i
  = αis∗
i + βi,f o ri =1 ,2, even
if the transition from  S,d  to  S ,d    is not due to a change in the utility representations but
10to a more signiﬁcant change in the feasible agreements.3 To be speciﬁc, consider a situation
in which two agents bargain over 50 (perfectly divisible) poker “chips”. Assume that each chip
awards its owner $0.01, and that both agents’ preferences satisfy the dual theory axioms. In
case of disagreement, both agents get no chips. This situation induces a bargaining problem
 S,d . Consider now a similar situation where both agents bargain over the same 50 chips but
now, agent 2 gets $0.02 for each chip while agent 1 still gets $0.01 per chip. Given that the dual
preferences are linear in money, the new situation induces a bargaining problem  S ,d    where




2)=( s1,2s2), for some (s1,s 2) ∈ S} and (d 
1,d  
2)=( d1,2d2). Since the
bargaining problem  S ,d    is obtained from  S,d  by means of a positive aﬃne transformation,
any bargaining solution that satisﬁes the invariance axiom selects the same division of chips in
both situations. One could argue that this result is reasonable because preferences are linear in
money prices. The motivation of the invariance axiom, however, has nothing to do with the above
change in the bargaining situation because in both situations the same cardinal representations
of the agents’ preferences were used. In any case, the invariance axiom implies that in both
situations the division of the chips be the same.
This feature of the invariance axiom, of having stronger implications than just the ones
suggested by its motivation, is not related to the fact that in the above example agents have
dual preferences. One can easily build a dual example that shows that the invariance axiom has
analogous consequences under expected utility. To see this, assume again that 2 agents bargain
over the same 50 chips. Now, as opposed to the previous situation, both agents are expected
utility maximizers. Further, each chip awards its owner not $0.01 but a 1% chance of winning $1.
That is, if an agent gets x chips, he is awarded a lottery that awards $1 with probability x/100
and $0 with the complementary probability. Normalizing utility so that ui(0) = 0 and ui(1) = 1,
for i =1 ,2, we get that the set of feasible utilities is S = {(s1,s 2):s1 + s2 ≤ 0.50} and that the
disagreement point is d =( 0 ,0). Now, consider a similar situation where agent 2 gets a 2% chance
of winning the dollar for each chip he gets while agent 1 gets 1% as before. The corresponding




2)=( s1,2s2), f o rs o m e( s1,s 2) ∈ S} and again,
any bargaining solution that satisﬁes invariance should select the same division of the chips in
both situations. One could argue that this result is reasonable because preferences are linear in
probabilities. The above change in the bargaining situation, however, has nothing to do with the
motivation of the axiom because there has been no change in the cardinal representations of the
agents’ preferences.
3We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this discussion.
11Summarizing, the axiomatic foundation of the Nash bargaining solution is as justiﬁed in the
context of the dual theory as it is in the context of expected utility. Therefore, we can now turn
to the analysis of changes in risk aversion on the bargaining outcomes.
The case of risk-averse agents
When the agents are risk-averse, both f and g are convex functions. As a result, we have the
following:
Proposition 1 Assume that both agents are risk-averse. Then S = X. Further, if in addition
one agent is strictly risk-averse, then a lottery is eﬃcient only if it assigns probability one to a
certain outcome.
Proof : By deﬁnition X ⊆ S. We shall show that S ⊆ X as well. Let (s1,s 2) ∈ S. Then there



















1 and s 
2 are the expected monetary payoﬀs that lottery   awards to agent 1 and agent
2, respectively. Therefore, (s 
1,s  
2) ∈ X. But since both agents are risk-averse, f and g are convex
functions, which implies that s1 ≤ s 
1 and s2 ≤ s 
2.S i n c eX is comprehensive, (s1,s 2) ∈ X. This
proves the ﬁrst part of the claim.
Assume now that   is an eﬃcient lottery. Then, since S = X we have
1=s 
1 + s 
2 ≥ s1 + s2 =1 .
Consequently, as s1 ≤ s 
1 and s2 ≤ s 
















G (t)dt = s 
2.
12Assume now that one agent is strictly risk-averse. Without loss of generality, assume that it is
agent 1. Then it follows from equation (2) that f(F (t)) = F (t) for all t ∈ [0,1], which in turn
implies that F (t) is either 0 or 1, that is,   is a degenerate lottery. ✷
As an immediate corollary of Proposition 1, we obtain the following:
Theorem 2 Let  S,d  be the bargaining problem induced by two risk-averse agents. The Nash
bargaining solution awards a utility level of 1/2 to each agent. In particular, changes in the
degree of risk aversion do not aﬀect the outcome.
Note that when both players are risk-averse, the only agreement that yields the utility pair
(1/2,1/2) is equal division with certainty. Since the outcome recommended by the Nash bargain-
ing solution does not involve randomness, it is perfectly reasonable that the degree of agents’ risk
aversion has no inﬂuence. An increase in the agents’ risk aversion means that lotteries are less
attractive. But since, by Proposition 1, when agents are risk-averse every utility pair that can
be obtained by means of a lottery can also be obtained by means of a certain outcome, changes
in risk aversion cannot have any eﬀect on the ﬁnal agreement.
Theorem 2 should be compared with Theorem 1 in Khilstrom, Roth, and Schmeidler (1981)
where it is shown that when the two agents are risk-averse expected utility maximizers, an
increase in the degree of risk aversion of one agent is beneﬁcial to the opponent. This is true
even though the utility pair singled out by the Nash bargaining solution always corresponds to a
certain outcome.
The case of risk-loving agents
As soon as one of the agents is not risk-averse, eﬃcient outcomes may involve nondegenerate
lotteries. In this case, an increase in the degree of risk loving (a decrease in the degree of risk
aversion) of one agent may aﬀect the outcome selected by the Nash bargaining solution, as the
following theorem shows.
Theorem 3 Let  S,d  be a bargaining problem and let  ∗ be a lottery that attains the utility
levels determined by the Nash bargaining solution. Assume further that  ∗ assigns probability
p to the outcome (1,0) and probability (1 − p) to the outcome (0,1). The utility which the
Nash bargaining solution assigns to a player does not decrease as his opponent becomes more
13risk-loving. That is N2( S,d) ≥N 2(S,d) where   S,d  is obtained from  S,d  by replacing agent
1 with a more risk-loving agent.
Proof : Since agent 1 has become more risk-loving, there is a concave and non-decreasing
function h, deﬁned on the unit interval, such that agent 1’s new preferences are represented by
the function h ◦ f and, therefore, his new utility function is given by V1( )=
 1
0 h(f[F (t)])dt.
Further, since  ∗ is a lottery that assigns probability p to the outcome (1,0) and probability
(1 − p) to the outcome (0,1), we have that U1( ∗)=f(p)a n d
V1( ∗)=h[f(p)] = h[U1( ∗)]. (3)
Now let ˜   be a lottery such that U2(˜  ) <U 2( ∗). We need to show that ˜   cannot attain the utility
levels selected by the Nash bargaining solution for the bargaining problem   S,d . By the way  ∗
was selected, we have U1( ∗)U2( ∗) >U 1(˜  )U2(˜  ). Therefore,




Since h is non-decreasing,




By the concavity of h,









which, together with (3) implies that V1( ∗)U2( ∗) ≥ V1(˜  )U2(˜  ). Since (V1( ∗),U 2( ∗))  =( V1(˜  ),U 2(˜  ))
we conclude that (V1(˜  ),U 2(˜  ))  = N( S,d). ✷
Note that the above theorem does not assume anything about the agents’ risk-loving except for
the fact that it should be enough to induce the Nash bargaining solution to select a non-degenerate
lottery whose prices are only the two extreme outcomes. The next result shows that a suﬃcient
condition for this kind of lottery to be selected is that both agents be risk-loving. Speciﬁcally, it
is shown that the utility possibilities frontier corresponds to lotteries that assign some probability
to the outcome (1,0) ∈ X and the remaining probability to the outcome (0,1) ∈ X.
14Proposition 2 Assume both agents are risk-lovers and let   be an eﬃcient lottery. Then there
exists p ∈ [0,1] such that a lottery, denoted by  ∗, that assigns probability p to the outcome (1,0)
and probability (1 − p) to the outcome (0,1) is utility-equivalent to  . If in addition one of the
agents is strictly risk-loving, then   =  ∗.






G (t)dt =1 .
Let p =
 1
0 F (t)dt and consequently (1−p)=
 1
0 G (t)dt. Consider a lottery  ∗ that awards the

























G (t)dt, ∀T ∈ [0,1]. (7)
Since both agents are risk-loving, equations (4)-(5) and inequalities (6)-(7) imply that
U1( ∗) ≥ U1( )a n dU2( ∗) ≥ U2( ).
But since   is eﬃcient we conclude that  ∗ and   are utility-equivalent, which proves the ﬁrst
part of the proposition. If one of the agents, say agent 1, is strictly risk-loving, then  ∗  =  ,
equation (4) and inequality (7) would imply that U1( ∗) >U 1( ), which is impossible. Therefore,
 ∗ =  . ✷
The following result is an immediate corollary of the above proposition and Theorem 3.
15Corollary 1 Let  S,d  be a bargaining problem where both agents are risk-lovers. The utility
which the Nash bargaining solution assigns to a player increases as his opponent becomes more
risk-loving. That is N1( S,d) ≥N 1(S,d) where   S,d  is obtained from  S,d  by replacing agent
2 with a more risk-loving agent.
When the agents are risk-lovers, the Nash bargaining solution awards a utility pair that can
be achieved only by a non-degenerate lottery. Consequently, it is reasonable that changes in the
agents’ risk loving aﬀect the outcome. The reason why an increase in the degree of risk loving of
one’s opponent is beneﬁcial is analogous to the reason why, under expected utility maximization,
an increase in the degree of risk aversion of one’s opponent is beneﬁcial. Under expected utility
maximization, an increase in one agent’s degree of risk aversion increases his utility from any
certain outcome in such a way that the equality-mindedness of the Nash bargaining solution has
no other choice but to “tax” him and transfer some of the surplus to the other agent. This
transfer of utility is implemented by means of a bigger share of the pie. Similarly, under the
dual theory an increase in one agent’s degree of risk loving increases his utility from any given
lottery in such a way that the equality-mindedness of the Nash bargaining solution has no other
choice but to “tax” the agent who beneﬁts from the increased utility and to make some stochastic
transfer to the other agent.
Again, it is instructive to compare Corollary 1 to the case of two risk-loving expected utility
maximizers. In this case, by choosing von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions such that
ui(0) = 0 and ui(1) = 1 for i =1 ,2, the utility possibilities set is given by X. As a result, the
Nash bargaining solution assigns an expected utility of 1/2 to each of the bargainers, independently
of their degree of risk loving. This utility pair can be achieved, however, only by the lottery that
assigns the whole pie to each agent with probability 1/2.
Summarizing, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 show that according to the dual theory the Nash
bargaining solution is sensitive to changes in risk attitude only when the Pareto-eﬃcient agree-
ments (and thus also the Nash solution) involve lotteries. This is in contrast to the expected
utility theory, where the solution is sensitive to changes in the players’ risk attitudes precisely in
cases where Pareto eﬃciency implies no lotteries.
5 The Strategic Approach
In this section, we analyze the eﬀect of risk aversion on the outcome of the well-known game of
alternating oﬀers. Consider the following game, denoted by Γ. Time is divided into periods. In
16odd-numbered periods, player 1 proposes a lottery   ∈Lto which player 2 responds either by
accepting it or rejecting it. In even-numbered periods, player 2 proposes a lottery and player 1
responds. Payoﬀs are as follows. If proposal   is accepted in period t, then player 1 gets U1( )δt−1
1
and player 2 gets U2( )δt−1
2 , where for i =1 ,2, δi ∈ (0,1) is player i’s discount factor, and Ui is
deﬁned in equation 1. If no player ever accepts, they both get 0.
The utility functions used here deserve a comment. Within periods, the function Ui represents
agent i’s risk-preferences. Across periods, the function Ui together with the discount factor δi
represent agent i’s time-preferences. In Rubinstein (1982), the set of feasible agreements is an
abstract set of outcomes, which are not necessarily lotteries. Hence, the issue of changes in risk
aversion does not arise. There, changes in Ui aﬀect player i’s time preferences. Here, since
the set of feasible agreements consists of lotteries, changes in the utility function also aﬀect the
within periods risk preferences. We are not deriving these joint preferences from basic axioms on
individual behavior but, as can be easily checked, the within periods risk-preferences satisfy all
the dual theory axioms and the across periods time-preferences satisfy all the properties required
by Rubinstein (1982). In particular, preferences are stationary and exhibit impatience.
We can state now the following result.
Proposition 3 Assume either that both players are risk-averse, with at least one of them strictly
so, or that both are risk-lovers, with at least one of them strictly so. Then, the game Γ has a
subgame perfect equilibrium. Further, there is a unique pair of eﬃcient lotteries ˆ  1 and ˆ  2 such
that in every subgame perfect equilibrium:
1. player 1 proposes ˆ  1, accepts ˆ  2 and all lotteries   such that U1( ) >U 1(ˆ  2) and rejects all
lotteries   such that U1( ) <U 1(ˆ  2);
2. player 2 proposes ˆ  2, accepts ˆ  1 and all lotteries   such that U2( ) >U 2(ˆ  1) and rejects all
lotteries   such that U2( ) <U 2(ˆ  1).
The pair (ˆ  1, ˆ  2) is the only pair of eﬃcient lotteries that solves the system
U1( 2)=δ1U1( 1)a n dU2( 1)=δ2U2( 2). (8)
Proof : Consider the system of equations (8). Proposition 1 tells us that when both agents are
risk-averse, system (8) becomes

y = δ1(1 − x)
x = δ2(1 − y)
(9)
17where x is the share of the pie that player 1 oﬀers to player 2 and y is the share of the pie that
player 2 oﬀers to player 1. It is immediately apparent that system (9) has a unique solution.





where p is the probability with which player 2 gets the whole object and 1− p is the probability
with which player 1 gets the whole object, according to player 1’s equilibrium proposal, and
similarly q and 1−q are the probabilities with which player 1 and 2 get the whole object, respec-
tively, according to player 2’s proposal. Since both f and g are concave functions, the system
of equations (10) has a unique solution as well. Therefore, under the proposition’s premises,
our game satisﬁes the assumptions of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Proposition 122.1, which
guarantees that the statement of our proposition is true.4 ✷
Theorem 4 If both players are risk-averse, with one strictly so, then an increase in the risk
aversion of one player does not have any inﬂuence on the outcome.
Proof : If both players are risk-averse, the unique equilibrium outcome is the solution to (9),
which is independent of the players’ degree of risk aversion. ✷
Recall that if the players were risk-averse expected utility maximizers, a player’s equilibrium
share of the object increases as his opponent becomes more risk-averse.
Theorem 5 Let Γ be a game of alternating oﬀers where both players are risk-lovers (one of them
strictly so) and let  Γ be the game of alternating oﬀers that is obtained from Γ by replacing player
2 with a more risk-loving player. Denote by   and ˆ   the corresponding equilibrium lotteries.
Then Fˆ   ≥ F . Namely, player 1’s payoﬀ distribution when his opponent is more risk-loving
stochastically dominates player 1’s payoﬀs when his opponent is less risk-loving.
4Our game does not satisfy Osborne and Rubinstein’s Assumption A1 but it does satisfy a weaker version of it,
which is all that is needed for their proof to work.




where both f and g are concave functions. Similarly, the unique equilibrium outcome of  Γ is the
solution to 
f(q)=f(1 − p)δ1
ˆ g(p)=ˆ g(1 − q)δ2,
where ˆ g = h ◦ g for some concave function h :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1]. Letting (p,q)a n d( ˆ p, ˆ q) be the
solutions to the above two systems of equations, respectively, it is well known that p>ˆ p.S e ef o r
example Roth (1985) or Roth (1989). Recalling that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
of Γ ( Γ) is a lottery that assigns the whole object to player 1 and player 2 with probability 1−p
(1 − ˆ p)a n dp (ˆ p), respectively (see Proposition 3), the random variable of player 1’s payoﬀs
stochastically increases when player 2 is replaced by a more risk-loving player. ✷
Note that if the agents were risk-loving expected utility maximizers, then an increase in the
players’ risk loving would have no eﬀect whatsoever on the equilibrium of the game of alternating
oﬀers.
6 On the Relation between the Strategic and the Cooperative
Approaches
6.1 A limit result
When the players are expected utility maximizers, the predictions of the cooperative and the
strategic approaches are related in the following sense: In the limit, as the players’ impatience
disappears, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game of alternating oﬀers converges
to the Nash solution of the associated cooperative bargaining problem. See for example Binmore
(1987) and Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986). Not surprisingly, the same result holds
when the players’ risk preferences satisfy the dual theory axioms. This is stated formally by the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider two agents whose preferences over lotteries are represented by the dual
theory and assume that either both agents are risk-averse or both are risk-lovers. Let  S,d  be
19the bargaining problem induced by these two agents and let (ˆ  1(δ), ˆ  2(δ)) be the pair of lotteries
identiﬁed in Proposition 3 for the variant of the game where both agents share the same discount
factor δ. Then, limδ→1(U1(ˆ  i(δ)),U 2(ˆ  i(δ))) = N(S,d), for i =1 ,2.
The proof is standard (see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Proposition 310.3 for instance)
and thus it is omitted.
6.2 A model with exogenous risk of breakdown
In Section 5, we analyzed a game of alternating oﬀers where the players have a degree of time
preference represented by a discount factor. Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) discuss
an alternative to this game, where agents do not present time preference but there is a ﬁxed
probability of breakdown after a player rejects a proposal. Speciﬁcally, consider a modiﬁcation
of the game presented in Section 5, such that there is no discount factor but after every rejection
there is a probability, 1 − δ, that the game ends, in which case each bargainer receives 0. Thus,
a typical path of play consists of rejections until period t (which can be ∞), at which point
there will be agreement on the division (x1,x 2), unless the game ended before. This path of play
generates the lottery that assigns probability δt−1 to the division (x1,x 2) and probability 1−δt−1
to the outcome (0,0). The corresponding utility levels for players 1 and 2 are, respectively,
x1f(δt−1)a n dx2g(δt−1), where again f and g are the “probability-evaluation” functions which
represent player 1’s and 2’s preferences, respectively. It is well known that if the players were
risk averse expected utility maximizers, this game would be strategically identical to the one
in which players have a common discount factor δ. As a consequence, both games would have
the same comparative statics properties with respect to changes in the degree of risk aversion.
Further, the subgame-perfect equilibrium agreement converges to the Nash agreement as δ goes
to 1. In our case, however, when players behave according to the dual theory of choice under risk,
the two games are no longer strategically equivalent. First of all, players’ preferences will not be
stationary in general, which means that one of Rubinstein’s (1982) basic assumptions fails to hold.
If one wants the preferences to be stationary, one needs to assume that the functions f and g are
of the form pα. Second, even if both players’ preferences are represented by the same potential
function, namely f(p)=g(p)=pα, still the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game exhibits
comparative statics properties that are opposite to those of the strategic game with discount
factor as well as to those of the Nash bargaining solution. Moreover, as δ tends to 1, the subgame
perfect equilibrium of this game does not converge to the Nash outcome of the corresponding
Nash bargaining problem. To see this, assume that both players have the same preferences over
20lotteries, that are represented by the function f(p)=g(p)=pα. For concreteness, assume
that agents are risk-averse, namely α>1. As pointed out above, every pair of strategies in
the game of alternating oﬀers yields a lottery that assigns probability δt−1 to a division (x1,x 2)
and probability 1 − δt−1 to the outcome (0,0). Denote this lottery by [t,(x1,x 2)]. Note now





1 δt −1. But this means that player 1’s behavior is identical to the behavior
of a risk-averse expected utility maximizer whose von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function is
u(x)=x1/α. A similar reasoning shows the same conclusion for player 2. Since we have shown
that the predictions of the Nash bargaining solution for agents whose preferences satisfy Yaari’s
axioms are diﬀerent from the predictions for expected utility maximizers, we conclude that the
game of alternating oﬀers with a ﬁxed probability of breakdown is essentially diﬀerent from the
game with impatient players. In particular, while an increase in one agent’s degree of risk aversion
does not inﬂuence the outcome predicted by the Nash bargaining solution when both agents are
risk-averse, it does reduce that player’s share in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game
with a ﬁxed probability of breakdown.
7 The Ordinal Nash Solution
The primitives of our model consist of a set of physical outcomes X, preferences over the set
of lotteries on X and the disagreement outcome D. Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992)
propose a solution concept that is intended to be applied to bargaining problems, like ours, that
are described in physical terms. They call their solution concept the ordinal Nash bargaining
solution for the good reason that when agents’ risk preferences satisfy the expected utility axioms,
it induces the (cardinal) Nash bargaining solution on the induced cardinal bargaining problem.
It is only natural then to inquire on the relation between the ordinal Nash bargaining solution
and the cardinal Nash bargaining solution as we applied it to our problem.
Let  p,   be the compound lottery that assigns lottery   with probability p and the disagree-
ment outcome, D, with probability 1 − p.A n ordinal Nash outcome is deﬁned to be a lottery
 ∗ ∈Lsuch that for all p ∈ [0,1], for all   ∈L , and for i =1 ,2a n dj =3− i, it satisﬁes that if
 p,    i  ∗ then  p, ∗   j  . The interpretation is as follows. If a player is willing to run a risk of
negotiations breakdown in order to get lottery   instead of  ∗ with certainty, then his opponent
is willing to run the same risk of breakdown in negotiations to get  ∗ rather than getting   with
certainty. Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992) call their solution the ordinal Nash bargaining
solution for the good reason that when the agents’ risk preferences satisfy the expected utility
21axioms, and therefore can be represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions ui for
i =1 ,2, then  ∗ is such that
E ∗(u1)E ∗(u2) ≥ E (u1)E (u2) ∀  ∈L ,
where E (ui) is agent i’s expected utility of lottery  .
When agents’ preferences satisfy the dual theory axioms, the ordinal Nash solution does not
induce the Nash bargaining solution on our induced cardinal problem  S,d . Namely, it is not
true that
U1( ∗)U2( ∗) ≥ U1( )U2( ), ∀  ∈L .
One would like to know if there is an ordinal dual solution that induces the Nash bargaining
solution in our framework. The solution we are looking for is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 A lottery  ∗ ∈Lis said to be a dual ordinal Nash outcome if for all α ∈ [0,1], for
all   ∈L , and for i =1 ,2a n dj =3− i,w eh a v e
if α   i  ∗, then α ∗  j  .
The interpretation is as follows. If a player prefers a proportion α of lottery   to lottery  ∗,
then his opponent prefers the same proportion of lottery  ∗ to the whole lottery  . An argument
similar to the one used by Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992) shows that if both agents’
preferences satisfy the dual theory axioms, then a dual ordinal Nash outcome  ∗ is such that
U1( ∗)U2( ∗) ≥ U1( )U2( ), ∀  ∈L .
Therefore, the dual ordinal Nash solution induces the Nash bargaining solution when the agents’
preferences satisfy the dual theory axioms.
The diﬀerence between the two ordinal solution concepts lies on the basic mixture operations
used in their respective deﬁnitions. The ordinal Nash solution is deﬁned by means of probability
mixtures — the ones that appear in the independence axiom. The dual ordinal Nash solution on
the other hand, is deﬁned by means of wealth mixtures or portfolios —the ones that appear in
the dual independence axiom.
Following the insights of Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) and the idea behind the
dual ordinal Nash solution, Dagan, Volij, and Winter (2001) deﬁne the time-preference Nash
solution, which turns out to be closely related to the cardinal Nash bargaining solution. Further,
22the time-preference Nash solution places no constraint on the risk preferences of the agents and
the comparative statics properties of the temporal Nash solution are consistent with the results
of this paper.
As a corollary of Section 5, we see that there is a discrepancy between the ordinal Nash
solution and the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game of alternating oﬀers. In
particular, as the discount factor approaches 1, the equilibrium outcomes do not converge to the
Nash ordinal solution. In fact, it can be shown that they converge to the dual ordinal Nash
solution. It is interesting to note that Rubinstein Safra and Thomson’s ordinal solution is the
limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the strategic game with a risk of breakdown
analyzed in Section 6.2.
8 Conclusions
We have shown that under the dual theory of choice under risk, standard comparative static
results on risk attitude in bargaining are reversed. Further, within the strategic approach, we
showed that the very details of the game may drastically aﬀect the comparative statics properties
of the subgame perfect equilibrium.
This paper does not argue that one theory is more relevant than the other in the context of
bargaining. This is an empirical question that can be answered only by means of empirical or
experimental research. Unfortunately, this evidence is very small and weak. Murnighan, Roth,
and Schoumaker (1988) for example, report results on several experiments that try to check the
eﬀects of risk aversion on bargaining outcomes. The results give mild support to the idea that
risk aversion is disadvantageous. While the strategic game they used allows agents to bargain
freely over a simple class of lotteries, it has a strict deadline after which a disagreement outcome
is implemented. This deadline makes the game very similar to the one analyzed in Section 6.2.
At the very last phases of the game, a player who must respond to an oﬀer knows that if he gives
a counteroﬀer there is a chance that the deadline is reached. As shown in Section 6.2, when there
is a risk of breakdown, the comparative statics of the model with expected utility maximizers
and with dual utility maximizers are qualitatively the same.
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1. Henceforth we will refer to the result mentioned above as “the result.”
2. The interested reader should consult Yaari (1986) for various and equivalent interpretations
of Deﬁnition 1.
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4. Our game does not satisfy Osborne and Rubinstein’s Assumption A1 but it does satisfy a
weaker version of it, which is all that is needed for their proof to work.
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